I really like this short piece, especially because it asks one of the most important questions: if the technology succeeds, what kind of society does the surplus produce? This is exactly the kind of long-term thinking we need, because only then can we ask what is actually best for society and for individuals.
One clarification I’d be interested in is whether the key axis is really “state vs. private hands,” or whether that frame understates the range of institutions that could mediate AI abundance. The non-state side may be more than just model owners or billionaires. It could include corporations, foundations, universities, unions, co-ops, nonprofits, religious institutions, and eventually network states or other sovereign-seeking communities. I’m not saying all of these institutions will survive in the long run, but in the short run, many may matter, especially because I don’t think all jobs will be replaced without major advances in robotics, and some may not disappear even with significant advances. These institutions could produce very different versions of “private” abundance.
I’d also separate control of the AI surplus from control of pre-AI chokepoints. Even if the existing rich don’t own the frontier models, they may still own land, housing, energy, finance, logistics, media, universities, healthcare, political access, and status networks. If intelligence becomes cheap while safety, land, compute, energy, status, human attention, and institutional access remain scarce, old wealth may still capture much of the upside. I don’t think AI abundance will erase old wealth for several generations in many cases; it may even make old chokepoints more valuable in the short term.
We also do not yet know which layer will capture most of the gains: model owners, compute and infrastructure providers, companies building on top of models, incumbent firms applying AI in fields like drug discovery or finance, or some new type of institution that does not yet exist.
Another related issue is exit power. Again, I may have misunderstood the post, but the frame seems to assume that the surplus can be politically allocated by either the state or private hands. But ultra-rich AI actors may not simply remain governable by existing city-states. They may jurisdiction-shop, move IP and compute, bargain for special zones, build network states, or use the threat of exit to limit taxation and regulation. So the question shifts from only who controls the surplus to also whether surplus-holders can escape democratic claims on it.
Network states are especially interesting because they blur the categories. I’m not advocating for them, and I don’t personally plan to join one even if I could. But in the best case, they might become laboratories of civic abundance: high-trust communities pooling surplus into education, healthcare, housing, research, culture, and shared infrastructure. In the worst case, they become gated micro-sovereignties: abundance for members, exclusion for outsiders, and governance captured by founders, token-holders, or ideological elites.
So the deeper question is: what agency do ordinary people have in the post-work settlement? Are they citizens, co-owners, members, and participants with real voice? Or are they consumers, clients, users, and subjects being managed by whichever institution controls the relevant bottleneck?
I agree that Civic Abundance seems like the right target, but it will likely require more than redistribution alone. It will require institutions that give people voice, ownership, exit, and dignity, as well as democratic states capable of binding mobile capital and quasi-sovereign actors to a shared civic settlement. Otherwise, even a materially generous AI future can still feel like dependency or managed comfort.
And at the individual level, there is another layer: purpose, identity, and meaning. Work currently supplies a lot of that for many people. If AI abundance reduces the need for labor, then the political question of surplus distribution becomes inseparable from the human question of what people do, belong to, and become.
Years ago our group played SimSoc for Simulated Society where four groups had independent rooms for decisions that would either bind us fruitfully or fracture our potential cohesion. We scored well without dissolution as the four components in the four rooms built together. This was either a Chamber of Commerce or City Leadership group activity. It was like wargaming but lifegaming, if I may choose that term.
To me the underlying question is one of mutual respect. Do we choose to include or exclude others? Are resources hoarded or shared? Is education encouraged optimally or minimally? Leaders in these sessions were chosen to consult with the outside stakeholders in our common fate of a sustainable society overall.
As I reflect on Christopher Nolan’s “The Odyssey” I think of Calypso and the lotus consumption that brought contentment without yearning or struggle. Odysseus had the ability to choose a goal higher than complacency. As modern society is led by increased consumption of tech, will tech be a lotus for humans or an impetus to still reach a home of higher goals than pleasure and indolence? What will enable or disable the overall human contribution to our future? Or will we hybridize ourselves into a new form of intelligent life?
A lot of folks have brought up SimSoc after they hear about or experience riskgaming. Definitely sounds like we’re in the same lineage. Do you know what happened to SimSoc?
For our game, I think Tech-Feudalism is the lotus for the rich, and Gulf Rentier is the lotus for the rest of us. Curious if you found both easy/hard to resist.
I really like this short piece, especially because it asks one of the most important questions: if the technology succeeds, what kind of society does the surplus produce? This is exactly the kind of long-term thinking we need, because only then can we ask what is actually best for society and for individuals.
One clarification I’d be interested in is whether the key axis is really “state vs. private hands,” or whether that frame understates the range of institutions that could mediate AI abundance. The non-state side may be more than just model owners or billionaires. It could include corporations, foundations, universities, unions, co-ops, nonprofits, religious institutions, and eventually network states or other sovereign-seeking communities. I’m not saying all of these institutions will survive in the long run, but in the short run, many may matter, especially because I don’t think all jobs will be replaced without major advances in robotics, and some may not disappear even with significant advances. These institutions could produce very different versions of “private” abundance.
I’d also separate control of the AI surplus from control of pre-AI chokepoints. Even if the existing rich don’t own the frontier models, they may still own land, housing, energy, finance, logistics, media, universities, healthcare, political access, and status networks. If intelligence becomes cheap while safety, land, compute, energy, status, human attention, and institutional access remain scarce, old wealth may still capture much of the upside. I don’t think AI abundance will erase old wealth for several generations in many cases; it may even make old chokepoints more valuable in the short term.
We also do not yet know which layer will capture most of the gains: model owners, compute and infrastructure providers, companies building on top of models, incumbent firms applying AI in fields like drug discovery or finance, or some new type of institution that does not yet exist.
Another related issue is exit power. Again, I may have misunderstood the post, but the frame seems to assume that the surplus can be politically allocated by either the state or private hands. But ultra-rich AI actors may not simply remain governable by existing city-states. They may jurisdiction-shop, move IP and compute, bargain for special zones, build network states, or use the threat of exit to limit taxation and regulation. So the question shifts from only who controls the surplus to also whether surplus-holders can escape democratic claims on it.
Network states are especially interesting because they blur the categories. I’m not advocating for them, and I don’t personally plan to join one even if I could. But in the best case, they might become laboratories of civic abundance: high-trust communities pooling surplus into education, healthcare, housing, research, culture, and shared infrastructure. In the worst case, they become gated micro-sovereignties: abundance for members, exclusion for outsiders, and governance captured by founders, token-holders, or ideological elites.
So the deeper question is: what agency do ordinary people have in the post-work settlement? Are they citizens, co-owners, members, and participants with real voice? Or are they consumers, clients, users, and subjects being managed by whichever institution controls the relevant bottleneck?
I agree that Civic Abundance seems like the right target, but it will likely require more than redistribution alone. It will require institutions that give people voice, ownership, exit, and dignity, as well as democratic states capable of binding mobile capital and quasi-sovereign actors to a shared civic settlement. Otherwise, even a materially generous AI future can still feel like dependency or managed comfort.
And at the individual level, there is another layer: purpose, identity, and meaning. Work currently supplies a lot of that for many people. If AI abundance reduces the need for labor, then the political question of surplus distribution becomes inseparable from the human question of what people do, belong to, and become.
Years ago our group played SimSoc for Simulated Society where four groups had independent rooms for decisions that would either bind us fruitfully or fracture our potential cohesion. We scored well without dissolution as the four components in the four rooms built together. This was either a Chamber of Commerce or City Leadership group activity. It was like wargaming but lifegaming, if I may choose that term.
To me the underlying question is one of mutual respect. Do we choose to include or exclude others? Are resources hoarded or shared? Is education encouraged optimally or minimally? Leaders in these sessions were chosen to consult with the outside stakeholders in our common fate of a sustainable society overall.
As I reflect on Christopher Nolan’s “The Odyssey” I think of Calypso and the lotus consumption that brought contentment without yearning or struggle. Odysseus had the ability to choose a goal higher than complacency. As modern society is led by increased consumption of tech, will tech be a lotus for humans or an impetus to still reach a home of higher goals than pleasure and indolence? What will enable or disable the overall human contribution to our future? Or will we hybridize ourselves into a new form of intelligent life?
A lot of folks have brought up SimSoc after they hear about or experience riskgaming. Definitely sounds like we’re in the same lineage. Do you know what happened to SimSoc?
For our game, I think Tech-Feudalism is the lotus for the rich, and Gulf Rentier is the lotus for the rest of us. Curious if you found both easy/hard to resist.